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ARTICLES
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
James E. Ryan, Jr.*
Renata Manzo Scruggs"
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the Virginia General Assembly made several relatively
minor, but significant, changes to the Virginia Administrative Pro-
cess Act (VAPA).1 These amendments modified the manner in
which agencies may promulgate regulations2 and conduct informal
fact finding hearings.3 Two new exemptions to the VAPA were cre-
ated: one for rules for the conduct of specific lottery games; and a
second for orders condemning shellfish growing areas.4 In other
changes, rulemaking proceedings conducted by the State Water
Control Board (SWCB),5 certain decisions of the Board of Social
Services,' and amendments to standards for asbestos inspections7
became subject to different provisions of the VAPA.
The 1989 General Assembly enacted changes to Virginia health
care facilities regulatory statutes which will affect administrative
* Partner, Mays & Valentine, Richmond, Virginia; B.Ch.E., 1968, University of Virginia;
J.D., 1971, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America.
** Attorney, Reynolds Metals Company, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1982, College of Wil-
liam and Mary; J.D., 1986, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary.
The author wishes to thank Alexander Macaulay and Nina Dillon for their invaluable assis-
tance in researching and gathering material for this article.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:1 to :25 (Repl. Vol. 1989). This article addresses legislation
from the 1989 session of the General Assembly and decisions of the Virginia courts issued
from May 1988 through June 9, 1989.
2. Id. § 9-6.14:7.1(C).
3. Id. § 9-6.14:11(B).
4. Id. § 9-6.14:4.1.
5. Id. § 62-1-44.15(3b) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
6. Id. § 63.1-119.
7. Id. §§ 2.1-526.12, 32.1-126.1, 36-99.7.
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procedures. First, it amended the certificate of public need law, ex-
empting certain types of facilities and projects from agency review
and extending the moratorium on the issuance of certificates of
public need for nursing homes until January 1, 1991.8 Second, the
Statewide Health Coordinating Council was eliminated and its
general role assigned to an advisory Health Planning Board, which
was endowed with a new set of powers.'
The General Assembly also re-enacted the Wine Franchise Act,10
the previous act having been declared unconstitutional by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia. 1
Finally, perhaps the most significant act of the General Assem-
bly was the establishment of a joint subcommittee to study Vir-
ginia administrative hearing procedure with a view toward creating
a system of full-time administrative law judges and uniform rules
of procedure.12
Although Virginia courts did not hand down any landmark cases
affecting administrative procedure, several decisions deviated from
the judiciary's recent deference to agency decision making. In one
such case, the Supreme Court of Virginia overturned a court of ap-
peals decision affirming the award of a landfill disposal permit by
the State Board of Health.'3 In another case, the court of appeals
eschewed the opportunity to dismiss an appeal of an agency deci-
sion on procedural grounds, and instead reversed the agency's deci-
sion on the merits. 14
Otherwise, the courts were predictable. The Supreme Court of
Virginia reversed an award of attorneys' fees in a VAPA appeal, 5
thereby affirming the axiom that attorneys' fees, although author-
ized by statute, are virtually impossible to obtain in practice. Fi-
nally, the lower courts dealt with procedural issues that were of
minor significance.' 6
8. Id. § 32.1-102.3:2.
9. Id. §§ 32.1-122.01 to -122.4.
10. Id. §§ 4-118.42 to .61.
11. Heublein, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 237 Va. 192, 376 S.E.2d
77 (1989).
12. H.J. Res. 333, 1989 Sess., 1989 Va. Acts 2103.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 116-133.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 158-63.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 148-57.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 165-72.
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II. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
PROCEDURE
A. Changes in Agency Decision Making Procedures
1. Public Participation in Rule Making Broadened
In 1989, the General Assembly acted to broaden public partici-
pation in the promulgation of agency regulations. Under existing
law, proposed regulations subject to the VAPA must be published
in the Virginia Register of Regulations to inform the public of the
intended action and to allow for public comment.1 7 Perhaps be-
cause many regulations are lengthy and difficult to read, which
may discourage the public from participating in the promulgation
process, agencies are now required to provide the Registrar of Reg-
ulations with not only a copy of the proposed regulation, but also
with a summary of that regulation and a concise statement of the
basis, purpose, substance and issues of the regulations.18 The text
of the regulations, plus the summary and statement, must be pub-
lished prior to promulgation. 19 If the agency is to conduct a public
hearing, it must include the summary with the notice of the hear-
ing published in the newspaper.20 This change should enable the
public to get a better grasp on proposed regulation changes.
2. Prior Notice of Basis of Agency Decision Required
A second change concerns agency case decision making.2 Unless
an agency is required to conduct a formal evidential hearing before
issuing its decision, it must "ascertain the fact basis" for its deci-
sion "through informal conference or consultation proceedings."22
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:7.1(C) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. VAPA defines "case decision" to mean:
any agency proceeding or determination that, under laws or regulations at the time, a
named party as a matter of past or present fact, or of threatened or contemplated
private action, either is, is not, or may or may not be (i) in violation of such law or
regulation or (ii) in compliance with any existing requirement for obtaining or retain-
ing license or other right or benefit.
VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4(D) (Repl. Vol. 1989). Thus, a letter from an agency applying the
rules and regulations to a particular party is a case decision, but a general statement of an
agency's position with regard to one aspect of its regulations, even though addressed to one
party, is not a case decision. Kenley v. Newport News Hosp., 227 Va. 39, 314 S.E.2d 52
(1984).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:11(A) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
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Because these proceedings are informal, the procedural rules for
trials, including the rules of evidence, are not used. Usually, there
is no opportunity for cross examination, nor are the parties to the
proceeding necessarily allowed to examine the information on
which the agency plans to rely in making its decision. Thus, the
parties are often not given the opportunity to respond to this in-
formation at the conference or at any other time before the agency
makes its final decision.2"
To help remedy the disadvantage an applicant or party has with
respect to the agency, the VAPA now requires that the agency pro-
vide all parties with advance notice of its intent to rely on any
"public data, documents or information" in making its case deci-
sion.24 This requirement does not apply, however, when the agency
intends to rely on case law or administrative precedent.25
Although this amendment is a step in the right direction, it does
not go far enough to ensure fairness in agency proceedings. At pre-
sent, each agency is allowed to promulgate its own rules as to how
such conferences are to proceed. Some agencies, intent on retaining
the "informal" aspect of the proceedings, do not require opposing
parties to give advance notice of the nature of the evidence they
intend to present at the conference.26 Advance notice is especially
important to the applicant, who is at a distinct disadvantage with-
out such notice and an opportunity to respond to opponents' evi-
dence at the conference. More importantly, the "fact basis" for the
decision cannot be ascertained unless all relevant facts are brought
to light and examined. Accordingly, it is doubtful whether the con-
ference is indeed a "fact-finding" proceeding if the parties are not
given the opportunity to rebut each other's evidence.2
23. In Johnston-Willis, Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231, 369 S.E.2d 1 (1988), the court of
appeals determined that the Health Commissioner's consideration of extra-record evidence
was improper, but insufficient to compel a remand to the agency. The court held that the
appellant must make "a clear showing of prejudice arising from the admission of such evi-
dence, or unless it is plain that the agency's conclusions were determined by the improper
evidence, and that a contrary result would have been reached in its absence." Id. at 258, 369
S.E.2d at 16; see Buniva, Administrative Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 22 U. RICH.
L. REV. 475, 485-89 (1988).
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:11(B) (Repl Vol. 1984).
25. Id.
26. For example, the Virginia Medical Facilities Certificate of Public Need Rules and
Regulations do not provide for such notice. 2:6 Va. Regs. Reg. 702-14 (1985) (effective 1986).
27. The Health Department's certificate of public need decisional practice denies the dis-
appointed applicant any opportunity for a formal evidentiary hearing, despite express provi-
sion therefore in its regulations. Id. at 712, § 9.1. The applicant is thus denied the opportu-
nity to make a proper evidential record for appeal. The Health Department is believed to
[Vol. 23:431
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Thus, a balance must be struck between retaining the informal-
ity of the proceeding, and instituting precautions that will insure
both that the proceeding is fair to all the participants, and that the
facts are indeed determined. One suggestion would be that all enti-
ties interested in participating in the conference file an advance
notice describing the specific factual and legal basis for their
intervention.
B. Changes in Applicability of VAPA
1. Exemptions Created for Lottery Rules and Shellfish Condem-
nation Orders
Rules for the conduct of specific lottery games are exempt from
the VAPA.28 Such rules must be consistent with the regulations of
the State Lottery Board, the latter of which must be published and
posted.2"
Until the 1989 General Assembly session, orders condemning or
closing shellfish, finfish or crustacea growing areas were exempt
from the VAPA provisions regarding regulations.3 0 Now such or-
ders are completely exempt from the VAPA. 3 1 This exemption al-
lows the agency to act quickly to close contaminated growing areas
in the event of an emergency such as the one in early 1989 when
approximately two million gallons of raw sewage spilled from a
waste treatment facility into the James River, contaminating the
oyster beds.32 Although these orders are exempt from the VAPA,
have based this practice on its interpretation of the decision in State Board of Health v.
Virginia Hosp. Assoc., 1 Va. App. 5, 332 S.E.2d 793 (1985), which invalidated regulations
that required every applicant to undergo an informal conference, followed by a formal evi-
dentiary hearing, to obtain a final decision. These regulations were designed to continue
past procedural practice, and plainly contravened a statutory amendment requiring an ap-
pealable decision within 120 days. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.6(E) (Repl. Vol. 1985 &
Cum. Supp. 1989). Neither the statute nor the court's decision, however, would preclude a
formal evidentiary hearing conducted at the request of the disappointed applicant.
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(B)(15) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
29. Id. Other aspects of the operations of the State Lottery Board are exempt from public
review. The confidential records of investigations of applications for licensees and licenses
made by the Board, all official records and other game-related information, and all official
records of studies and investigations of lottery agents, vendors and crimes, are not subject to
freedom of information requests. Id. § 2.1-342(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1989). In addition, the
Board can hold closed, executive meetings to discuss, consider and review matters related to
proprietary lottery game information. Id. § 2.1-344(A)(16).
30. Id. § 9-6.14:4.1(C)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
31. Id. § 9-6.14:4.1(B)(16) (RepI. Vol. 1989).
32. See Virginia Gazette, Jan. 4, 1989, at 1A, col. 1.
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they must be filed with the Registrar either before or after their
effective dates "to satisfy the need for public availability of infor-
mation respecting the regulations of state agencies." 3
2. Amendments to State Water Control Board Water Quality
Standards Require Formal Hearing
The General Assembly responded to a 1988 state circuit court
decision 4 by clarifying the rules governing the SWCB's amend-
ments to its water quality standards regulations.3 5 Although the
SWCB is subject to the VAPA, the circuit court case brought to
light an ambiguity in the process by which the SWCB amends
these standards.
In September 1987, the SWCB amended its water quality stan-
dards to prohibit chlorine in discharges to streams inhabited by
threatened or endangered species or classified as trout waters.3 6
The Appalachian Power Company (APCO), which uses chlorine as
an anti-fouling agent at its Clinch River plant, appealed the regu-
lation to the Circuit Court of the City of Roanoke.37 The court
ruled that the regulations had not been validly promulgated be-
cause the SWCB failed to conduct a formal evidentiary hearing. 8
In so holding, the circuit court accepted APCO's argument that the
State Water Control Law39 requires the SWCB to conduct a hear-
ing prior to revising its water quality standards.40 The law also re-
quires that the water quality standards be adopted in accordance
with the VAPA.41 The VAPA defines a "hearing" as an "opportu-
nity for private parties to submit factual proofs in formal proceed-
ings."' 42 The SWCB argued that a hearing meant only the "oppor-
tunity" for a hearing and that because APCO had the opportunity
to request a formal hearing, but did not do so, the regulations were
promulgated validly.43 The court did not accept this argument and
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.18 (Rep. Vol. 1989).
34. Appalachian Power Co. v. Commonwealth, No. CH87-000733 (Roanoke Aug. 17,
1988).
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
36. 3:18 Va. Regs. Reg. 1941 (1987).
37. APCO, No. CH87-000733, slip op. at 1-2.
38. Id.
39. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.3 to -44.38 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
40. APCO, No. CH87-000733, slip op. at 1.
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(3b) (Rep. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
42. Id. § 9-6.14:4(E) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
43. Commonwealth's Memorandum in Opposition to APCO's Motion for Summary Judg-
[Vol. 23:431
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ruled that the SWCB was obligated to conduct formal evidential
hearings pursuant to section 9-6.14:8 of the Code of Virginia when
it promulgated the challenged regulations, and the failure to con-
duct such hearings was a reversible error.44
The General Assembly made the circuit court's interpretation of
the law explicit in the statute.45 Under the revised law, the SWCB
must hold a formal hearing pursuant to section 9-6.14:8 upon the
request of an affected person or upon its own motion.46 If it is not
requested to hold a formal hearing, it must "afford interested per-
sons an opportunity to submit data, views, and arguments, either
orally or in writing, to the agency.'
4
1
3. Amendments to Asbestos Inspections Standards Subject to
VAPA
The General Assembly also brought two other agency actions
within the purview of certain provisions of the VAPA. The first
such action relates to the standards for the inspection of asbestos
in certain buildings.4 s In 1988, the General Assembly exempted the
promulgation of these standards from the VAPA.49 In 1989, the
General Assembly appears to have reversed its field by requiring
that all amendments to these standards be promulgated pursuant
to the VAPA ° The reasoning behind this change, as with the orig-
inal exemption, is unclear.51
ment at 4, APCO v. Commonwealth, No. CH87-000733 (Roanoke Aug. 17, 1988).
44. APCO, No. CH87-000733, slip op. at 1-2. The SWCB responded to this decision at its
September 1988 meeting by re-promulgating the regulations under the VAPA provisions
authorizing adoption of regulations without a hearing in "emergency" situations. 5:2 Va.
Regs. Reg. 215-17 (1988). The Board contended that an emergency existed because the regu-
lations were without force and the inability of the SWCB to enforce these regulations on
APCO posed an "unacceptable threat to the environment." Id. at 216.
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(3a) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
46. Id.
47. Id. Presumably, the statute will be construed to allow the SWCB to conduct informal
proceedings initially, promulgate the standards, and thereafter reconsider the standards in a
formal hearing upon request by an affected party or its own motion.
48. The buildings include hospitals, buildings to be renovated or demolished, child care
centers and condominium conversions.
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-526.14 (Cum. Supp. 1988); see also Buniva, Administrative Law:
Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 475, 494 (1988).
50. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-526.14:1(B), 32.1-126.1 (inspection standards for hospitals), 36-
99.7 (buildings to be renovated or demolished), 55-79.94 (condominium conversions) (Cum.
Supp. 1989). The General Assembly appears to have omitted child care centers.
51. See Buniva, supra note 49, at 494.
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4. Public Assistance Decisions Subject to Judicial Review
In a second action, certain case decisions by the State Board of
Social Services regarding public assistance are now subject to the
judicial review provisions of the VAPA.52 The case decisions sub-
ject to this requirement involve the granting or denial of aid to
dependent children, Medicaid, food stamps, general relief, auxil-
iary grants, or state-local hospitalization. 53 Judicial review is lim-
ited, however, to the agency record, and the court is only allowed
to ascertain whether there was evidence in the agency record to
support the case decision.54
The General Assembly was careful to limit the extent of the ju-
dicial review. The statute excludes from the review the adequacy
of the standards of need and payment levels for public assistance
programs, and precludes review of the validity of any statute, regu-
lation, standard or policy upon which the agency action was
based.55
C. Changes in Health Care Law
1. Certificate of Public Need Law Revised But Not Abolished
The General Assembly continued its review of certificate of pub-
lic need (COPN) law in the 1989 session.56 After considering the
report of the Governor's Commission on Medical Care Facilities
Certificate of Public Need, the General Assembly rejected argu-
ments that the COPN law should be repealed entirely and contin-
ued its moratorium on the approval of new nursing home beds un-
til 1991. 58
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:16(B) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The amendment also excludes intermediate relief pursuant to section 9-6.14:18 of
the Code of Virginia. Id.
56. A "certificate of public need" is similar to a franchise. Before a medical care facility
can be built, or medical equipment can be purchased, permission must be obtained from the
Virginia Department of Health, assuming certain monetary thresholds for the facility of
equipment have been met. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.1 (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1989).
The purpose behind the law is to control health care costs by allowing only those facilities
or equipment for which there is a demonstrated need.
57. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES CERTIFICATE OF
PUBLIC NEED (1987) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT]. The Commission was
established in 1986. Exec. Order No. 31 (1986).
58. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3:2 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
438 [Vol. 23:431
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The legislative amendments eliminate agency approval of virtu-
ally all new equipment and new services, regardless of cost. New
equipment or services that cost more than $400,000 must be regis-
tered with the Health Commissioner. 9 Many specialized centers
are no longer subject to COPN review, however.60 Regulatory re-
view is retained, however, for establishing new medical care facili-
ties, adding or relocating beds, and for certain specialized new ser-
vices. 1 A July 1, 1991 sunset provision was imposed for regulation
of outpatient or ambulatory surgical centers.6 2
For medical care facilities that remain subject to the law, the
1989 amendments remove the minimum capital expenditure ex-
emption from review. 3 Thus, all such facilities, regardless of capi-
tal cost, must undergo agency review.
The Governor's Commission Report recommended that nursing
homes remain under COPN review," but that the COPN proce-
dure be revised to eliminate "gaming" and other procedural
tricks.6 5 The General Assembly did not resolve this issue, but de-
cided instead to extend the moratorium on COPN approvals for
nursing homes to January 1, 1991.6
The General Assembly has been grappling with hospital and
nursing home cost regulation for several years in its attempt to
lower the state's astronomical Medicaid bill." It has been ham-
pered by the lobbying efforts of industry and other interest groups,
some opposing deregulation, others supporting it, and others advo-
cating continued regulation only if similar providers remain regu-
59. Id. § 32.1-102.3:4.
60. These are: renal dialysis therapy, radiation therapy, computerized tomography, scan-
ning, and other medical or surgical treatments requiring the utilization of equipment not
usually associated with the provision of primary health services. Id. § 32.1-102.1.
61. These include open heart surgery, psychiatric, medical rehabilitation and substance
abuse services not previously offered. Id. (subsection four under definition of "project").
62. Id. § 32.1-102.3:3.
63. Id. § 32.1-102.1.
64. See GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 57, at 32.
65. Id. at 34-36.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3:2 (Cum. Supp. 1989). As under the previous moratorium,
the Health Commissioner is authorized to issue COPNs for the renovation or replacement
on site of an existing facility to comply with life safety codes, licensure, certification or
accreditation standards. Id. The Commissioner can also approve the conversion of existing
nursing home beds to skilled nursing service beds if certain specified conditions are met. Id.
67. According to the Governor's Commission, at the time of its Report, the State's Medi-
caid budget was $1.4 billion for the biennium. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
57, at 24.
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lated.6 s As a result, the 1989 legislation was a hodgepodge of
changes to the existing regulatory review system, rather than a
change of direction, 9 which may be necessary to success in control-
ling health care cost increases.
2. Statewide Health Coordinating Council Replaced with Virginia
Health Planning Board
The Governor's Commission Report also recommended that the
Statewide Health Coordinating Council be abolished and its func-
tions70 re-delegated to the Health Commissioner. 1 The report rec-
ommended reconstituting the Council in an advisory capacity.7 " It
also recommended the establishment of a system of regional health
planning advisory boards,73 which would assume full responsibility
for the development of the State Health Plan and State Medical
Facilities Plan, for the adoption by the Board of Health.4
The General Assembly followed these recommendations and re-
pealed the statutory provisions regarding the Statewide Health Co-
ordinating Council,7" replacing the Council with a newly created
entity, the Virginia Health Planning Board.76 This advisory Board
is charged with supervising the statewide health planning system
and participating in the development of state health policy.77 Spe-
cifically, it must help develop, but not approve, the State Health
Plan.78 These amendments also created regional health planning
agencies,79 which are charged with aiding the State Planning Board
in developing the State Health Plan. 0
68. Id. at 15-18.
69. Mandatory hospital rate review, as applied in Maryland, would be an example of a
new direction for regulation of hospital costs. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 19-201, -222
(Repl. Vol. 1987).
70. The Health Coordinating Council held the responsibility for approving the State
Health Plan and the State Medical Plan, the state's primary health planning documents.
71. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 57, at 36. The reasoning behind this rec-
ommendation was that the federal law, which mandated the formation of the Council, had
been repealed. Id.
72. Id.
73. These would replace the regional Health Systems Agencies, mandated by the repealed
federal law, which had the responsibility for regional review of COPN applications. Id.
74. Id. at 36-37.
75. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-117 to -122 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
76. Id. § 32.1-122.02.
77. Id.
78. Id. § 32.1-122.03.
79. Id. § 32.1-122.05.
80. Id.
[Vol. 23:431
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D. Wine Franchise Act
The General Assembly acted promptly in 1989, using emergency
legislation, to repeal and reenact a revised Wine Franchise Act af-
ter the Supreme Court of Virginia declared the entire act unconsti-
tutional in Heublein, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control.8 l In Heublein, the court found that the Wine Franchise
Act was unconstitutional on three grounds. First, the court found
that the provision prohibiting the termination of at-will contracts
in the six-month period before the act became effective violated
the contract clause."2 Second, the provision requiring wineries to
amend all contracts they have with out-of-state wholesalers to con-
form to any unilateral contractual amendments with Virginia
wholesalers was found to be an unlawful attempt to regulate the
commerce of other states in violation of the commerce clause.83
Third, the statute's exemption of small Virginia farm wineries was
found to be an impermissible attempt to favor local wineries over
out-of-state wineries, also in violation of the commerce clause.,s Fi-
nally, in spite of the inclusion of a non-specific severability clause,
the court found that the General Assembly would not have enacted
the Act without the unlawful provisions, and therefore these provi-
sions could not be severed from the rest of the act.8 5 For this rea-
son, the court held the entire Act to be unconstitutional. 6
The General Assembly responded quickly to this decision. The
existing Act was repealed, 7 offensive provisions deleted, and the
Act re-enacted without these provisions."" The Act was put into
force immediately upon its passage.8 9 The new Act is virtually
81. 237 Va. 192, 376 S.E.2d 77 (1989).
82. Id. at 197, 376 S.E.2d at 78. In reaching this determination, the court examined the
interplay between the prohibition of legislation impairing the obligation of contracts and the
exercise of the state's police powers. Id. at 196, 376 S.E.2d at 79. The court agreed with the
trial court's holding that limitation on a winery's discretionary right to terminate contracts
with its wholesalers was a "severe alteration of contractual obligations." Id. Moreover, the
court could not find a valid police power purpose behind the condition; rather, it found it to
be "simply an effort to protect a small group of wholesalers from possible economic loss."
Id. at 197, 376 S.E.2d at 79. For this reason, the court invalidated the provision. Id.
83. Id. at 198, 376 S.E.2d at 79.
84. Id. at 199, 376 S.E.2d at 80. The court found this purpose to be explicit in the legisla-
tive background of the Act. Id.
85. Id. at 200, 376 S.E.2d at 81.
86. Id. at 201, 376 S.E.2d at 81.
87. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4-118.21 to -118.41 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
88. Id. § 4-118.42 to .61 (Cum. Supp. 1989).
89. Id.
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identical to the previous Act, except for those new provisions in-
serted to replace the invalidated provisions."
E. Joint Subcommittee to Study Administrative Hearing
Procedure
In 1986, the General Assembly amended VAPA to allow the use
of private attorneys in formal adjudicatory hearings." The 1986
amendments codified the existing practice of using attorneys in
private practice as hearing officers, 92 and has raised questions con-
cerning conflicts of interest and other deficiencies in the system. 3
The 1989 General Assembly recognized these problems when it
passed a joint resolution establishing a joint subcommittee to
study the administrative law hearing system."4 These problems
were brought to the General Assembly's attention by the Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee on Hearing Officers, ("Ad Hoc Committee
Report"), which was submitted to the legislature on December 7,
1988.11 The Ad Hoc Committee Report made two recommenda-
tions which, if instituted, would undoubtedly have a profound ef-
fect on Virginia administrative procedure. The first recommenda-
tion was for a system of full-time hearing officers. According to the
report, one of the most common complaints about the existing sys-
tem is that the part-time hearing officers lack expertise regarding
90. These new sections include a provision allowing wineries to amend their contracts
with Virginia wine wholesalers, provided such amendments are not inconsistent with the
Act, a conflict of laws provision providing that Virginia law applies to any contract gov-
erning the marketing of wine in Virginia, a provision defining when a contract is to be
deemed in effect as of the effective date of the Act and therefore covered by the Act, and a
shortened severability clause. Id. §§ 4-118.47, -118.57, -118.58, -118.61.
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:14.1 (Cum. Supp. 1987); see also Jones, Administrative Proce-
dure: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 611, 622 (1987).
92. Jones, supra note 91, at 622.
93. Jones, supra note 91, at 622-27; see also VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics
Op. Nos. 987, 981 (1987).
94. H.J. Res. 333, 1989 Sess., 1989 Va. Acts 2103. Some of the other problems cited in the
joint resolution creating the subcommittee were the lack of a mechanism for developing
precedent and case law, decisional inconsistency that has led to confused interpretations of
statutes and regulations, and a rotation system that has not permitted the development of
sufficient professional expertise. Id.
95. REPORT OF THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON HEARING OFFICERS at 3 (1988). The Ad Hoc
Committee was established by Secretary of Administration Carolyn Jefferson Moss. It con-
sists of two members of the Virginia State Bar, two members of the Virginia Bar Associa-
tion, two or three Agency heads and two or three hearing officers. The Ad Hoc Committee
was established on the recommendation of the Governor's Commission on Efficiency in Gov-
ernment to review the use of attorney volunteers as hearing offers in the decision of admin-
istrative cases in Virginia. Id. at 2.
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the laws and regulations they are engaged to interpret and apply."'
The problem is caused by inadequate training and a mandatory
rotation system that denies hearing officers the opportunity to de-
velop expertise in any particular subject area. 7 This lack of exper-
tise has, the report found, contributed to decisional inconsistency
and increased transactional costs."8 The committee recommended,
therefore, that the hearing officer's primary function should be
presiding over hearings.9
The second recommendation was for standardized formal hear-
ing rules that would apply to all regulatory agencies, boards and
commissions."' 0 Of the more than sixty agencies polled by the com-
mittee, thirty-one reported that they used procedural rules in addi-
tion to the VAPA.101 The report found that a second, common
complaint was inefficiency that resulted from having to learn new
rules for each agency. 10 2 Thus, the report concluded, uniform pro-
cedural rules would produce greater efficiency in case decisions, re-
duce the likelihood of meritorious claims being foreclosed by pro-
cedural technicalities 0 3 and "enhance the image of governmental
fairness.
'104
The joint subcommittee is charged, therefore, with the responsi-
bility to study the feasibility of creating a panel of full-time ad-
ministrative law judges and establishing uniform rules of proce-
dure for administrative hearings.10 5 The subcommittee must
submit its recommendations to the Governor and the General As-
sembly by December 1, 1989,106 presumably so that any bills con-
cerning a new system can be addressed in the 1990 session.
A full-time panel of hearing officers would help solve the
problems cited by the General Assembly and others. 10 7 By using
96. Id.
97. Id. at 4-5.
98. Id. at 3.
99. Id. at 5. An additional benefit produced by the employment of full-time hearing of-
ficers through a central office, as opposed to employment through individual agencies, would
be the reduction of the appearance of undue influence of the agency over the conduct of the
hearing and recommended decision. Id.
100. Id. at 6.
101. Id. at 7.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. at 9.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. E.g., Jones, supra note 91, at 622-27.
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judges who are not in private practice and who would not be ap-
pearing before the same agency on behalf of a client, the potential
for conflict of interest and the appearance of impropriety would be
reduced.
The potential disadvantages to this approach are increases in
transactional costs and the further institutionalization of the pro-
cess, resulting in a larger bureaucracy. These disadvantages are not
extreme, however, because most agencies will continue to use infor-
mal proceedings to handle most rulemaking and case decisions. It
would not be necessary to involve hearing officers in these informal
proceedings if the agency affords the parties an opportunity for a
later formal evidentiary hearing.
Practitioners should welcome both proposed changes. Appearing
before knowledgeable and professional hearing officers using uni-
form rules should enable attorneys to make more accurate predic-
tions of how their cases will be decided. These changes should also
increase the use of case decision precedents, facilitating better
preparation of cases before agencies.
III. AGENCY DECISION AFFECTING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Several important procedural decisions were made in a formal
hearing before the State Air Pollution Control Board (SAPCB) on
a permit to operate a poultry rendering plant.08 Citizens living
near the proposed rendering plant petitioned the SAPCB for a for-
mal hearing on their challenge to the issuance of the permit. The
SAPCB had no formal hearing rules and decided to employ the
SWCB's Procedural Rule No. 1 for that purpose.
The hearing officer appointed by the SAPCB rejected the appli-
cant's contention that the citizens had no standing to prosecute
the appeal, relying on the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision in
Virginia Beach Beautification Commission v. Board of Zoning Ap-
peals.10 9 The hearing officer held that "those persons occupying or
owning land within close proximity of a proposed rendering plant
of this nature have a 'substantial' grievance in terms of potential
impact of obnoxious odors."" 0 The applicant also contended that
108. Formal Hearing on Mountain View Rendering Company Permit (Registration No.
21087) (State Air Pollution Control 1988).
109. Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Formal Hearing on Moun-
tain View Rendering Co. Permit (Registration No. 21087) at 13-14 (Aug. 18, 1988).
110. Id. at 13.
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the hearing officer must conduct a hearing in the same manner as a
reviewing court, sustaining the SAPCB on the basis of its informal
record if its initial decision were supported by substantial evi-
dence. The hearing officer rejected the applicant's contentions con-
cerning the burden of proof and scope of review.
The logical conclusion of this approach would be that, even though
the formal record, standing alone, might support a Board decision in
the petitioner's favor, petitioner could prevail only by showing that
the informal record standing alone could not have reasonably sup-
ported the Board's previous decision. Neither the VAPA, Procedural
Rule No. 1, nor the principles of administrative law support such a
position.1
The hearing officer concluded that the record of the formal hearing
should be reviewed in its entirety, de novo, and that the "degree of
proof required should be similar to the 'preponderance of the evi-
dence' standard applied in the majority of civil cases in Vir-
ginia. 1 .1 2 The hearing officer also concluded that "parties who have
petitioned for the formal hearing have the burden of going forward
on the issues of fact and shall bear the burden of ultimate persua-
sion on all issues.' 1 13 The hearing officer's decisions on these points
were accepted by the SAPCB as part of its final decision.
IV. JUDICIAL DECISIONS AFFECTING ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
A. Judicial Deference to Agency Action
One of the hallmarks of judicial review of agency decisions is the
high degree of deference afforded to agency decisions by the
court." 4 In recent years, courts have overturned agency decisions
only on rare occasions. In 1988, however, the Supreme Court of
Virginia, the Court of Appeals of Virginia, and the lower courts did
111. Id. at 17.
112. Id. at 18-19.
113. Id. at 15.
114. Under the VAPA, the burden is on the party complaining of the agency action to
designate and demonstrate an error of law. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17 (RepI. Vol. 1989). The
court's review is limited to an examination of the agency record; no de novo review is al-
lowed. Id. The standard of review with respect to issues of fact is whether there is substan-
tial evidence in the record to support the agency's decision. Id. Under this standard, the
court can overturn the agency's decision only if, considering the record as a whole, a reason-
able mind would necessarily come to a different conclusion. Virginia Real Estate Comm. v.
Bias, 226 Va. 264, 269, 308 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1983) (emphasis in original).
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
reverse several agency decisions. 115 These cases should probably
not be viewed, however, as an emerging trend away from judicial
deference to agency decision making.
In Board of Supervisors v. King Land Corporation,"6 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia reversed the court of appeals decision 7
that had upheld the agency's action. In this case, the State Health
Commissioner had issued a permit to operate a solid waste landfill
without requiring proof of financial responsibility." 8 The Virginia
solid waste statutes" 9 directed the State Board of Health to pro-
mulgate regulations requiring owners of solid waste landfills to
show evidence of financial responsibility for closure and post-clo-
sure care, but the statute did not contain a deadline for the pro-
mulgation of the regulations. 20 The Board had not promulgated
any such regulations at the time the permit was issued. 2' The
Board of Supervisors of King and Queen County challenged the
issuance of the permit as an error of law because the permittee was
not required to demonstrate financial responsibility. 2 2 The court
of appeals held that the Board of Health's failure to promulgate
the regulations did not invalidate the permit because the statute
lacked a specific deadline for promulgating the regulations. 23
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the court of appeals, 124
holding that because the Board of Health had failed to promulgate
the regulations within a reasonable time after the statute had been
enacted, the Health Department lacked the authority to issue any
115. E.g., Board of Supervisors v. King Land Corp., 238 Va. 97, 380 S.E.2d 895 (1989);
Cooper v. Occoquan Land Dev. Corp., 8 Va. App. 1, 377 S.E.2d 631 (1989); Lundy v. Meril-
lat Indus., 14 Va. Cir. 224 (1988).
116. 238 Va. 97, 380 S.E.2d 895 (1989).
117. King Land Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 4 Va. App. 597, 359 S.E.2d 823 (1987).
118. 238 Va. at 99, 380 S.E.2d at 895.
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-182 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
120. The statute required the Board to:
no sooner than October 1, 1981, promulgate regulations which insure that, in the
event that a facility for the disposal of solid waste or a facility in which hazardous
waste is stored, treated, or disposed is abandoned, the costs associated with protect-
ing the public health and safety from the consequences of such abandonment may be
recovered from the person abandoning the facility.
C. No sooner than October 1, 1980, and no later than March 1, 1980, the Board shall
make available for public hearing and comment an initial draft of such regulations.
Id.
121. King Land Corp., 238 Va. at 101, 380 S.E.2d at 896.
122. Id. at 102, 380 S.E.2d at 897.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 105, 380 S.E.2d at 898.
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landfill permits until the regulations were in effect and complied
with by permit applicants.12
Because the statute was ambiguous, the court was required to
determine the intent of the legislature, by invoking a principle of
statutory construction known as the "mischief rule.' 1 26 "Under this
rule, every statute is to be read so as to 'promote the ability of the
enactment to remedy the mischief at which it is directed.' 11127 The
court found that the mischief the General Assembly sought to re-
dress was expressed in the statute, i.e., to protect the public from
the potentially adverse consequences of abandoned landfills.
28
Construing the statute in light of this purpose, the court held that
the General Assembly intended the Board of Health to finalize the
regulations by October 1, 1981.1' The court found further that be-
cause the intent of the General Assembly was to suppress the mis-
chief described above, it must have intended that no permits could
be granted if the financial responsibility requirements were not fi-
nalized by that date. 130
Justice Lacy, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued
that the statute did not provide that the Commissioner's licensing
authority would be terminated if it failed to issue the regula-
tions. 3' Furthermore, by terminating the Commissioner's licensing
authority, the dissent contended that the majority created as much
mischief as it sought to remedy. 3 2
When this case is examined in light of federal environmental
case law, it is not surprising that the permit was invalidated.' 3
What is somewhat surprising is that the Supreme Court of Virginia
125. Id.
126. Id. at 102, 380 S.E.2d at 897.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 103-04, 380 S.E.2d at 898.
129. Id; see supra note 120.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 107, 380 S.E.2d at 899-900 (Lacy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 106, 380 S.E.2d at 899. In support of this argument, Justice Lacy contended
that if no permits could be issued, the "multi-pronged regulatory scheme" would be dis-
rupted, and state control over an area "clearly sought to be regulated" would be withdrawn.
Id.
133. The trend in environmental law is to take a strict stand in favor of protecting the
environment, even when other, traditional legal axioms must yield. Nowhere is this more
evident than in the federal "Superfund" legislation, where courts have discarded traditional
rules of corporate liability in holding officers and directors of corporations responsible for
hazardous waste sites personally liable for clean up costs. See, e.g., United States v. North-
east Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), modified, 810 F.2d
726 (8th Cir. 1986).
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would do so, given its tradition of judicial deference, and the fact
that the statute in question did not state expressly that no permits
could be issued if the financial responsibility regulations were not
promulgated within a certain time.
Earlier in 1989, the Supreme Court of Virginia followed its tradi-
tional approach to agency review in Ford Motor Co. v. Courtesy
Motors.14 In this case, Ford wished to grant a franchise to a deal-
ership located within six miles of an existing dealer. The Commis-
sioner of Motor Vehicles, operating pursuant to the Virginia Motor
Vehicle Dealer Licensing Act, 135 designated a hearing officer to
hear evidence whether the market could support a second dealer-
ship. 13  Before making his decision, the hearing officer was re-
quired to obtain the recommendation of the Motor Vehicle Deal-
ers' Advisory Board.' 37 Despite the Act's mandate that no two
Board members could be dealers of the same manufacturer, 8' two
members were Ford dealers. 3 9 The hearing officer obtained the
recommendations of most of the members of the advisory board,
including the two Ford dealers. 4 0 The Commissioner determined
that the existing dealer had failed to show that the market could
not support a second dealership.""
The existing dealer appealed this decision to the circuit court
which confirmed the Commissioner's findings. 4  The dealer then
appealed to the court of appeals, which reversed the trial court on
the grounds that the recommendations of the Advisory Board
members were a condition precedent to the Commissioner's action,
and because the Board was not validly constituted, the Commis-
sioner's decision was invalid. " 3
134. 237 Va. 187, 375 S.E.2d 362 (1989).
135. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46.1-515 to -550.538 (Repl. Vol. 1986) (repealed 1989 Va. Acts
727).
136. 237 Va. at 189, 375 S.E.2d at 363.
137. Id. at 189, 375 S.E.2d at 363.
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-550.2 (Repl. Vol. 1986) (repealed 1989 Va. Acts 727).
139. 237 Va. at 189, 375 S.E.2d at 363.
140. Id. The members of the Board did not meet and act as a unified body in rendering
their recommendations, but rather acted independently, each sending his individual recom-
mendation to the hearing officer. There was no evidence in the record that any of the Board
members, including the two Ford dealers, had consulted each other before sending their
recommendations. Id. at 191, 375 S.E.2d at 364.
141. Id. at 189-90, 375 S.E.2d at 363.
142. Id. at 190, 375 S.E.2d at 363.
143. Courtesy Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 1 Va. App. 366, 339 S.E.2d 202 (1986).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the court of appeals.'
It found that the disqualification of one member of the board was
harmless error and did not nullify the action of the remaining
board members. 145 This case is more typical of judicial review in
Virginia 4 6 in that the court refused to overturn the agency's deci-
sion in spite of a violation of State law by invoking the doctrine of
"harmless error.' 147
B. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees
The VAPA provides that in any civil case brought under the ju-
dicial review sections a person who challenges an agency action
and "substantially prevails on the merits" can recover reasonable
costs and attorneys' fees from the agency, if the agency is found to
have acted unreasonably. 48 It would appear from the lack of re-
ported cases in this area that such fees are rarely awarded. 49
Recently, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed an award of
attorneys' fees. Commonwealth v. Lotz Realty Co.'5 0 culminated
protracted litigation that pitted the right to religious freedom
against Virginia's anti-discrimination laws. In this case, a realtor in
144. 237 Va. at 190-91, 375 S.E.2d at 364. The court based its decision on the following
factors:
First, there is no evidence indicating that Courtesy's rights were affected in any
way by the disqualification of one board member.
Second, the board does not act as a body; the statute contemplates that each mem-
ber make his or her recommendations to the Commissioner, and that is what was
done in this case. There is no evidence that either Britt or Barkhouser had contact
with each other or the other board members before each of the five board members
submitted independent recommendations. Moreover, the Commissioner could have
disregarded these recommendations.
Third, the statute permits one member of the board to be a Ford dealer; excluding
either Barkhouser or Britt from consideration, a total of four members, a majority of
the board, recommended granting the second franchise.
Id. at 191, 375 S.E.2d at 364.
145. Id. at 190-91, 375 S.E.2d at 364.
146. See, e.g., Johnston-Willis Hosp., Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231, 258-59, 369 S.E.2d 1,
6-7 (1988); Cooper v. Occoquan Land Dev. Corp., 8 Va. App. 1, 377 S.E.2d 631 (1989);
Greenlee v. Virginia Supplemental Retirement Sys., No. 0765-88-1 (Va. App. 1989); Lowe v.
Virginia Supplemental Retirement Sys., 13 Va. Cir. 221 (1988).
147. 237 Va. at 190-91, 375 S.E.2d at 364.
148. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:21 (Repl. Vol. 1989). This provision contains one caveat, how-
ever, and that is that attorneys fees and costs will not be awarded if "special circumstances
would make an award unjust." Id.
149. One would assume that if the fees were awarded, the agency would appeal the award.
From the lack of appeals from such awards, one can surmise that they are rarely granted.
150. 237 Va. 1, 376 S.E.2d 54 (1989).
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Newport News used Christian symbols and slogans in its advertis-
ing.'51 The Virginia Real Estate Commission filed a complaint
against the realtor charging that the realtor was violating the Vir-
ginia Fair Housing Law. 152 The circuit court found that the Com-
mission had failed to carry its burden of proving a violation of the
statute and awarded attorneys' fees to the realtor.1 53
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court's decision
with respect to the violation, but reversed the order awarding the
attorneys' fees. 54 With little discussion, the court found that be-
cause the trial court had not found that the Commission had acted
unreasonably, "and the record would not have supported such a
finding in any event"' 5 the award should be set aside.
This case affirms the proposition that attorneys' fees are difficult
to recover in VAPA cases. The difficulty probably arises in part
from the standard of review itself, which requires the court to
"take due account of the presumption of official regularity [and]
the experience and specialized competence of the agency."156 Thus,
there is a presumption that the agency has acted reasonably, and
the challenger has the burden of showing the agency has acted un-
reasonably. This is a formidable burden, especially if it is con-
strued by the courts as the state agency's attorney would have it.' 57
151. Id. at 4, 376 S.E.2d at 55. In conjunction with the use of these symbols, the realtor
included a disclaimer in many of its advertisements that claimed to "list, sell and rent any
property without any preference, limitation or discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin or any intention to make such a preference, limitation or discrimina-
tion." Id. at 6.
152. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-86 to -96 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989). The Act pro-
vides in part:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory housing practice, because of race, color, reli-
gion, national origin, sex, elderliness, parenthood or handicap for any person having
the right to sell, rent, lease, control, construct, or manage any dwelling constructed or
to be constructed, or any agent, independent contractor or employee of such person:
(3) To make, print or publish, or cause to be made, printed or published any no-
tice, statement or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates any preference, limitation or discrimination, or an intention to make any
such preference, limitation, or discrimination.
Id. § 36-88.
153. 237 Va. at 6, 376 S.E.2d at 57.
154. Id. at 12, 376 S.E.2d at 59.
155. Id. at 11, 376 S.E.2d at 59.
156. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
157. In addition to finding that the challenger has prevailed substantially on the merits,
the court must base its judicial finding of unreasonableness on "some more stringent stan-
dard, such as, for example, evidence that responsible, supervisory personnel of the agency
knew or should have known that the agency's action was arbitrary and capricious or was in
bad faith and took no corrective action." 1983-84 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. at 3 (1983). Even then,
1989] ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
C. Other Procedure Issues
1. Timing of Filing Appeals
In Cooper v. Occoquan Land Development Corp.,158 the trial
court dismissed an appeal of a decision of the State Technical Re-
view Board because the appeal had not been filed in time.159 The
Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, which govern the filing of
a notice of appeal pursuant to the VAPA, require that the notice
be filed within thirty days after the agency enters its order.6 0 This
rule is jurisdictional and thus cannot be extended.' 6 '
Although the courts grant deference to an agency decision, a
court reviewing another court's decision with regard to an agency
matter will not grant the same degree of deference. Here the court
of appeals had little difficulty overturning the judge's ruling as to
when the agency decision had been entered. 62 This case is curious
the agency may excuse itself from liability by showing "special circumstances that exist
which would make an award unjust." Id. at 4.
158. 8 Va. App. 1, 377 S.E.2d 631 (1989). The appellant development corporation had
obtained building permits to construct homes on several lots. When the lots flooded after a
heavy rain, the county building official revoked the permits on the ground the permit appli-
cations did not contain complete and accurate information, even though the applicant had
certified that the application was in compliance with all applicable ordinances and regula-
tions. The county board of building code appeals ordered reinstatement of the permits upon
full compliance. The State Technical Review Board, to which the applicant then appealed,
concluded that the permits should not have been revoked, and ordered that the permits be
restored, because there was insufficient evidence that the applicant had made any false
statements or misrepresentations of fact. The county then appealed this decision to the
circuit court. Id. at 3-4, 377 S.E.2d at 632.
159. Id. at 1, 377 S.E.2d at 631.
160. VA. SuP. CT. R. 2A:2.
161. Forbes v. Kenley, 227 Va. 55, 57, 314 S.E.2d 49 (1984) (time requirements of Part 2A
of Rules mandatory and jurisdictional); C.f. Saunders Oil Co. v. Pethtel, 13 Va. Cir. 337
(1988), writ denied,__ Va. -, S.E.2d - (1989). In this case, the petitioner attempted
to protest a contract made by the highway department. According to VA. CODE: ANN. § 11-
66(A) (Repl. Vol. 1989), such protest must be filed within ten days after the bid records are
made available for inspection. 13 Va. Cir. at 338. The petitioner was not able to obtain
copies of the records until six weeks after the award was made, and then filed his petition
within ten days after receiving the records. Id. at 337. The circuit court ruled that the peti-
tion was not timely filed: "the critical point in time in which the ten-day response time
begins is when the records are 'available for inspection'. . . It was the petitioner's duty, not
VDOT's responsibility, to ascertain the award date and to whom the award was given and to
inspect the bid documents at VDOT offices, if necessary." Id. at 338-39.
162. Cooper, 8 Va. App. at 4-6, 377 S.E.2d at 633-34. The order was ambiguous because it
contained three different dates. The only date that claimed to be the date of entry was
almost one year before the date of the hearing, and thus was clearly a typographical error.
The other two dates, which were later than the first in month and date, appeared without
explanation. The obvious conclusion is that the date that claimed to be the date of entry
should have been treated as such, except that the year should have been corrected. Had this
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because, for the most part, courts prefer to dispose of appeals on
procedural grounds rather than reach the merits. In Cooper, on the
other hand, the court reversed the procedural dismissal, and then
went on to reverse the Board's reinstatement of the permit.16 For
this reason, the case also represents a step away from judicial def-
erence to the agency's decision.
2. Timing of Hearings on Appeal
In contrast to the mandatory filing requirements of Rule 2A,16 4
one circuit court has found that the statutory time limits for court
hearings of grievances of public employees are directory. In
Blackwell v. Department of Motor Vehicles165 the grievance proce-
dure for state employees 16 6 required that the trial court hear an
appeal from the agency within thirty days of receipt of the record
and render its decision no later than fifteen days from the end of
the hearing. 6 1 In this case, the agency record was filed in May, but
the court did not take any action until November of the same year
when the grievant requested a hearing.66 The hearing was then
scheduled for February of the following year.'69 The agency con-
tended that the time limit for conducting the hearing had long
since expired, and therefore the court no longer had jurisdiction to
hear the appeal.17 0 The court rejected the agency's argument by
finding that the time limits in the statute were directory rather
than mandatory, and thus the failure of the court to act within
these limits did not divest the court of its jurisdiction to go for-
ward with the appeal.' 7 1
Two points can be gleaned from this case. First, the court may
have felt the need to redeem itself for its delay in hearing the ap-
peal, although it is unclear whether the employee had the responsi-
been done, the appellant would have definitely been dilatory in its filing of the notice of
appeal. Instead, the court chose the last date, which allowed the appeal to go forward. Id. at
5-6, 377 S.E.2d at 633-34.
163. Id. at 8, 377 S.E.2d at 634-35. The court found that because the applicant had certi-
fied that the application was complete when it was not, the applicant had made an affirma-
tive, although perhaps unintentional, misrepresentation. Id. at 8-9, 377 S.E.2d at 634-35.
164. VA. Sup. CT. R. 2A.
165. 14 Va. Cir. at 326 (1989).
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-114.5:1 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
167. Id. § 2.1-114.5:1(E).
168. 14 Va. Cir. at 327.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 329.
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bility to request the hearing or whether the court was obligated to
contact the employee. The second point is that the court was un-
willing to deny the employee his day in court because of circum-
stances that may have been beyond his control.
V. CONCLUSION
The General Assembly was relatively active in the area of ad-
ministrative law in 1989, although it made only minor revisions to
the VAPA itself. In creating two exemptions to the VAPA and put-
ting certain agency actions, but not entire agencies, under the con-
trol of the VAPA, the legislature further complicated the already
complex applicability rules of the VAPA. The General Assembly
made some progress on needed revisions to the COPN law, al-
though the changes did not simplify this murky area of administra-
tive procedure. Finally, by establishing a joint subcommittee to
study rules and hearing officers for administrative hearings, the
General Assembly raised expectations that it will introduce more
organization, skill and certainty into these important forums.
Although not breaking new ground, the Virginia courts showed a
willingness to examine agency decisions more closely than in the
past, instead of merely affirming the agency decision with little or
no comment. Although some could argue that this reduces the cer-
tainty and finality of agency decisions, it also demonstrates that
challengers to agency decisions can obtain meaningful court
reviews.
The General Assembly should continue its review of the COPN
law during the next several sessions, and should address legislation
aimed at establishing a uniform administrative hearing system.
These would be welcome developments. The courts will most likely
continue their cautious approach to agency actions, although there
are some signs that agency decisions will receive closer scrutiny in
the future.
1989]

